This article examines how the birth and the development of regional systems of innovation are connected with economic selection and points to implications for regional-level policies. The research questions are explored using an evolutionary model, which emphasises geographical spaces and production of intermediate goods. In particular we are concerned with how cooperative behaviour of technology producers is a¤ected by the need to protect technological secrecies and of being …nancially constrained by …rms demanding innovative input. Based on the theoretical model, we provide an analysis using computer simulations. The primary …ndings are, …rstly, that the model generates predictions suited for empirical research on how economic selection in ‡uences cooperative behaviour of innovative actors. Secondly, we demonstrate how a region's entrepreneurial activity and growth can be controlled in a decentralised way by regions
Introduction
In the Nelson-Winter evolutionary model, innovations depend on R&D expenditures, which grow and decline with the growth and decline of …rms (Nelson & Winter 1982) . This approach does not fully take into account recent insights into the organisation of the innovative process mainly provided by geographers (Cooke & Morgan 1998; Saxenian 1994; Scott 2000; Storper 1997 ). The inclusion of geographical spaces improves the organisation-theoretic foundation of the evolutionary model in di¤erent ways. An extended model takes account of the vertical disintegration of large …rms and the production of intermediate goods.
In this paper we focus on the production of innovative input within regional systems of innovation, which join together infrastructure (in particular knowledge infrastructures such as universities and R&D facilities) and innovative behavior (Werker & Athreye 2004) . Many studies of regional innovation systems are motivated by beliefs that the relation between technical advance and regional growth depends on the amount of technological knowledge in a region. Yet, the connections between the body of knowledge and the knowledge that is economically exploitable (economic knowledge) are awkward, which has been discussed by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) and more recently by Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) . Cantner and Graf (2004) focus on e¢ cient organisation of knowledge creation in regions and …nd that regions that are technologically moderately specialised with regard to kind of knowledge and degree of sophistication show the highest number of research cooperations. Their approach is inspiring, but they have no explicit reference to economic selection. In the following, we try to introduce geography in an evolutionary model and, at the same time, examine questions of how Cantner and Graf's analysis of regional innovation systems can be connected with Audretsch and Keilbach's approach to economic selection.
We note that the Lisbon Strategy launched by the EU raises interesting policy questions about connections between technical advance and regional differences in growth. For a long time, it appeared as if the European regions converged, but more recent evidence challenges this perception (Cappelen et al. 2003) . The notion of a regional system of innovation incorporates policy variables (institutions for higher education, technology advisory centres), which in part are controlled through regional-level policies. Inquiries into this system may improve the understanding of decentralised (regional) approaches to the realisation of the Lisbon Strategy. The primary aim of this paper is to examine if evolutionary modelling, which highlights relations between geographical spaces, regional systems of innovation and competitive selection, generates patterns with empirical relevance for research on regional involvement in EU technology policies on regional growth. Inspired by recent discussions about improvements of the …rst generation of Nelson-Winter models (Malerba et al. 1999; Sloth Andersen 2001) , we thus propose an evolutionary model and a computer simulation program for logical exploration of causal relations that, hopefully, will improve the arguments put forward in future empirical research.
The …rst …nding of our study indicates that an evolutionary model that admits production of intermediate goods provides insights into how regional systems of innovations are born and develop. In vertically disintegrated production systems, the technology producers perceive a need to protect technological secrecies and they are …nancially constrained by the demand for innovative input by downstream …rms. With reasonable assumptions about these perceptions and conditions, our simulations produce sensible development paths for the system of innovation. The second …nding suggests that the development path can be controlled in a decentralised way by regions that take actions to a¤ect the interaction between technology producers; either by changing the degree of specialisation or by an exemplary model -a key entrepreneur -who perceives market needs and initiates business opportunities. If a regional policy-maker takes these actions to create favorable conditions for cooperative behavior within a region, it will usually help the …nance of the entrepreneurial activity and the growth of the same region. However, the simulations made for this paper suggest that a zero-sum game is going on between the regions unless the regional-level policies are coordinated with the knowledge management strategies of large …rms (with a¢ liations in di¤erent regions).
Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of the evolutionary model we use to explore our research questions. Production of intermediate goods is included through the regional system of innovation, which produces and sells new technology to …rms in the region (national …rms) or to …rms with a¢ liations in different regions. These …rms invest in facilities to produce for product markets.
Section 3 describes how the model is applied to illuminate issues on regional involvement in policy-making. Here we show how our approach for examining cooperative behavior of innovative actors di¤ers from research on innovative behavior based on specialisation. The simulations are reported in section 4, which also includes appropriate interpretations. Section 5, …nally, contains a few concluding remarks.
The model 1
The geographic dimension of evolutionary modelling is seen through the lens of vertical disintegration and production of intermediate goods. It is also built on the work of Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) , who argue that the selection of economic knowledge from the whole body of knowledge is the result of entrepreneurs, who increase regional growth by starting new …rms. They argue that entrepreneurs place a high value on knowledge, which is not valued as highly by hierarchical decision making organisations in incumbent …rms. Entrepreneurs start new …rms to appropriate this value. This perspective is broadened in our paper, …rstly, by separating knowledge in national …rms, which develop by learning in regional spaces, from knowledge in multinational …rms (MNEs) unfolding by learning in supra-regional spaces. It is an urgent task to describe the implications for innovative behavior of a larger capacity of MNEs to develop, orchestrate and integrate a wide variety of technological knowledge. Secondly, the perspective is broadened as the entrepreneurs also rely on technological knowledge created in regional innovation systems.
Our approach emphasises changes in the industrial structure due to vertical disintegration of large …rms leading to increased growth of a small business sector (cf. Carree & Thurik 1999 ). This approach is in the spirit of scholars arguing that the so-called new growth theory is unable to explain why large investments in R&D do not always result in rapid economic growth (Carlsson et.al. 2007) . By neglecting the di¤erence between economic knowledge and the whole body of knowledge, this theory do not only disregard the importance of the "knowledge …lter" preventing knowledge from becoming economically useful, 1 For a complete description of our model, please contact the authors.
but it also neglects entrepreneurship that converts economic relevant knowledge to economic activity. In our paper, we deal with entrepreneurship by noting a new kind of technological regime, where the translation of basic research into commercial knowledge is carried out by small …rms in industries with a large share of large …rms (see Carlsson et.al. 2007 for more details about this regime).
Stable states of small …rms are contradictory to belief that small …rms are ine¢ cient and therefore are eliminated by competitive selection. But, as Carree and Thurik (1999) conclude, small …rms can compensate for cost disadvantages by creating networks or other inter-…rm linkages. From this perspective, entries into and exits from a small business sector can be seen as changes in regional systems of innovation. This sector develops new technology for technology markets and the producers become patent-holders and sell patents and licences to other …rms, which invest in new facilities to produce for product markets.
Literature on industrial districts argues that social networks constitute the foundation required for the creation of business-oriented regional networks (Lechner & Dowling 1999) . Regional networks constitute the small business element of an innovation system. The institutional set-up (infrastructure) of a region a¤ects opportunities for mobilising pockets of available resources in the social network, which depends on the presence of a key entrepreneur or scientist (Lechner & Dowling 1999; Gerybadze 1998; Sternberg 1996) . In our model, there is one key entrepreneur in each region, who initiates business opportunities. The inventors start to learn about a business opportunity when the key entrepreneur "perceive(s) a market need" (Kline & Rosenberg 1986, p. 289) . The conditions for learning about new interests are favorable when the individuals share a common professional background (Checkel 2001) , i.e. the chance for a regional network to appear within the social network is good.
In the spirit of DeCanio and Watkins (1998), we imagine an inventor as persuaded to participate in the development of a business opportunity. The probability of him/her joining a business-oriented regional network increases if the number of colleagues in the social network he or she is connected with, who argue in favour of the business opportunity, is su¢ cient. Before he/she becomes an advocate of a business opportunity, the di¤erent aspects of the opportunity must be understood and information received from colleagues must be digested thoroughly. This requires the use of information-processing capacity, which is limited for the individual inventor (this kind of limitation is fully explored by Simon, 1981) . Di¢ culties with dense social networks are also discussed by Burt (1992) , who points to redundant contacts, which lead to the same people and, thus, provide the same messages. The most favorable conditions for the creation of regional networks are associated with multiple agents competing for the occupation of structural holes, which connect non-redundant contacts.
Drawing on De Canio and Watkins, we suggest the following relationship between the probability for an inventor to individually consider a business opportunity, his or her information processing capability and the structure of the social network:
where P g i is the probability for an inventor i in region g to consider a business opportunity, and d g i (t) is a random variable with either the value of one or zero, according to whether the inventor does or does not consider the opportunity.
While 1 and 2 are constants, 2 is a parameter introduced to represent the processing power. Furthermore,
Y g il (t) = 1 if inventor i is connected to inventor l (in the sense that he or she is informed about l's situation) and l considers the business opportunity at t: Y g il (t) = 0 if the inventor is connected to l, but the latter does not consider the business opportunity. Z g i (t) is the total number of inventors inventor i is connected to. An inventor with a large number of contacts with other members of the social network is unable to digest all information he or she receives. Since a business opportunity will not be considered, information will not be di¤used, impeding the development of the regional network.
The structure of the social network changes over time (new contacts are established and old ones are broken). The establishment of new contacts at t depends on the interaction between inventors and on the chance that the interaction will lead to a contact. The chance varies between regions according to, for instance, the degree of specialisation. The number of meetings of i and l at each point in time -n il -is associated with infrastructures that orchestrate the dialogues among technical workers (e.g., technology information centres, regional science and technology societies, supplementary education). The probability that i and l will exchange information at a meeting -p il -depends on variation in knowledge and sophistication among the technology producers. The probability for a meeting between two inventors to lead to exchange of information is high, if they perceive their competencies as equal, and low in other cases.
In addition, high probability requires that the kinds of knowledge held by the inventors are complements rather than substitutes.
2 h refers to the minimum number of meetings, where information has been exchanged between i and l, required to establish a contact. Moreover, t 0 is the point in time when inventors i and l begin to establish connections after social contacts have been broken or when a business opportunity last failed for i or l . t 0 = 0, if i and l have never broken a contact or been involved in a business opportunity.
The sequences of meetings are considered independent Bernoulli trials, i.e.
for n il (t t 0 ) h the probability for a contact to establish between inventors i and l in region g at t is determined by the binomial formula:
The technological knowledge in a region derives from di¤erent sources: 1) from inventor activities within the region, 2) from spill over received from other regions and 3) from knowledge channelled through multinational enterprises (MNEs). Technology from 3) crosses supra-regional spaces within the organisational spheres of MNEs. By calling attention to this source, we want to emphasise the importance of knowledge management by MNEs. While 1) and 2) provide public knowledge, knowledge from 3) depends on how MNEs link corporate strategies with changes in the organisational capital which is technological information that belongs to the …rms. By suitable knowledge management, MNEs gain from geographic specialisation and from the ability to orchestrate supraregional technology di¤usion and, thereby, achieve competitive advantages over national …rms. At the same time, they master "information stickiness", which our model treats as a barrier to 2) ("spill over received from other regions"). Weitzman 1998).
The di¤usion of a technology starts with an invention leading to a new product model, which afterwards induces a series of additional innovations based on the same technology. Our model depicts the di¤usion of product models invented and produced in two regions (g and g), and supplied in one market.
The technology gap between the regions can be measured as 2
, where s g > s g . Due to "stickiness", only a portion ( 1 ) of the di¤erence in technological knowledge is transferred from g to g external of the MNEs. Moreover, the ability to interpret and to understand information received (the absorptive capability) in g decreases when the gap between the regions increases. Thus, the net spill over between regions g and g, which is not channelled through MNEs, is
The …rst term to the right of the equity sign shows the technological knowledge available in g, when the spill over is included. However, due to less absorptive capability in g, only part of the technology spill over can be recombined with new ideas, which is taken into account by the expression in the denominator. The spill over between the two regions is found after the knowledge deriving from the inventor activity in the lagging region (the second term to the right of the equity sign) has been subtracted.
MNEs are net-worked in both regions, and information is collected and redistributed through internal systems for information and knowledge management.
Accordingly, all employees in a MNE have access to the same information and the same number of recombinations of old ideas can be formed (2
We may think about the coupling between a regional innovation system and economic selection as preliminary designs, proposed by inventors working together, and examined by …rms balancing technical problems and market gains.
The probability for an innovation at time t depends on expectations about …rm-growth, which vary with changes in the rate of growth of the common market.
Whether an innovation derives from inventor activities in region g or in g depends on the probability for …nding solutions to technical problems, which increases with the number of combinations of product speci…c knowledge and with the capacity to process information in the respective regions.
After the decision to innovate has been made, the …rm has to decide about the location of production. MNEs can fully gain from geographical specialisation, while national enterprises (NEs) sometimes are facing a trade-o¤ between low production costs and access to innovative input. In our model, production costs depend on a spill over parameter expressing the proportion of technological knowledge spilling over from experience accumulated in the production of less advanced goods.
The value of the parameter depends on the rate of qualitative changes from one product variant to another and on the number of types of product-speci…c knowledge transferred. A wide range of product-speci…c knowledge requires a large labour market for the recruitment of quali…ed employees ("economies of a pooled labour force"). The more properties of prior products incorporated in a new product, the more sensitive are the productions costs.
New product variants enter into the market; products produced above average e¢ ciency extend their market shares and below average products lose market shares and sometimes exit from the market. The epidemic model of technology di¤usion is applied to depict this evolutionary process through which economic selection proceeds. The di¤usion process is described by a complex equation, which is illustrated by the following simple logistic function
where the total number of potential users of a product model, n, is given beforehand. Moreover, m s j (t) is the number of users of product model s j at date t, and is the rate of di¤usion. This is a disequilibrium approach, where the process is self-perpetuating: the use of a product is initiated through contacts between users and non-users, which leads to further use. The marketing literature commonly includes external sources of information, such as advertising, implying that the di¤usion process no longer is completely self-propagating (see Stoneman, 2002) . No position is taken on which type of external intervention the …rms use, but we assume that the resources they have for external interventions depend on economic performance.
In our model, management does not know the thorough production costs before entering into the market. This idea is discussed by Jovanovic (1982) , who assumes that …rms learn about their production costs after starting production.
In our model, no entrant knows the true costs, which is a random draw from a normal distribution of costs. Firms making favorable draws can a¤ord low prices and e¢ cient marketing. Our approach to competitive selection also notes that a new product o¤ers improved quality or performance as compared with an older product, which could a¤ect demand across products. These interrelationships between products are taken into account in the sense that a user of product s j may substitute this product for another product s i .
Economies of scale explain why young …rms exit from an industry (Audretsch 1995 ). In our model, a product model remains on the market throughout its exploratory stage (products younger than t) and there are expectations that the minimum e¢ cient plant-size (ms ) will be attained in this stage. Thus, no product model is eliminated from the market during the exploratory stage. For product models of age t and older, the following condition is valid for exit 5 :
where the number of users (m s j (t)) has been replaced by the market share (ms s j (t)).
Empirical challenges
One question arising is if evolutionary modelling with a geographic dimension generates patterns with empirical relevance. To answer this question, we draw attention to the EU's Lisbon Strategy, which is supposed to make Europe the most competitive knowledge based economy in the world by 2010. 6 In addressing the regional dimension of the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission connects regional disparities in research, innovation and economic growth to Europe's capacity to stay competitive in world markets. Regions are expected to play a "motor" role in the overall context of economic growth, and the achievement of greater cohesion in the EU depends on "the integration of research capabilities in less favoured regions in the European research fabric".
7
Obviously, more recently the EU Commission has overridden the regional dimension by the globalisation perspective. This is a response to the fact that new scienti…c and technological powers (China and India) have become attractive for business as a location for R&D investments. 8 Contrary to the seemingly devaluation of regional equalisation by the Commission, our simulation 5 Empirical evidence shows that both small and large …rms disappear from the market after the di¤usion of a new technology has culminated; economies of scale, thus, is not an important aspect of high exit rates. Therefore, this condition will be reformulated in future research (cf. Gort & Klepper 1982) . model is constructed to address issues on how innovation systems can be used to reduce regional imbalances. This paper, however, focuses on understanding decentralised (regional) approaches to the realisation of the Lisbon Strategy.
That is, it is expected to improve the "region-conscious" development model for the organisation of European research, which the EU Commission suggested at an early stage. Since the regions have di¤erent pro…les, the Commission advocates the reliance on "the self-organising capacity of regions" which it considers a growth factor, and on "territorialisation" implying a "tailor-made" research policy approach that addresses speci…c territorial conditions.
9
This can be done because our model admits that the selection of technological designs produced in a region becomes more probable when the amount of knowledge and the research capability of the regional innovation system increase. In addition, the research capability increases with the size of the regional network, which agrees with Cantner and Graf (2004, p. 544) , who argue that "cooperation is favorable to innovation". This conclusion is crucial for our study, where it is claimed that the size of regional networks can be a¤ected by regional-level politics. It also sets for a discussion of a strategy for the satisfaction of what the EU Commission de…nes as a need to overcome the fragmentation of the European research base. Overcoming this fragmentation is believed to help regions to "attract a critical mass of human and …nancial resources from across the world". We doubt, however, the conclusion drawn by the Commission that concentration and specialisation is necessary to permit the emergence of one group of European centres of excellence and another group of centres which excel in addressing research and training at the national, regional and sectorial levels. 10 We suggest a method to examine if the critical mass can be attracted within the context of the new development model and without regional imbalances.
One implication of vertical disintegration and production of intermediate goods is that large …rms may put limitations on the regional research capability. They may be reluctant to share technological knowledge with external producers of technology. The EU Commission concludes that achieving the Lisbon objectives is facilitated by regional strategies encouraging "dynamic operators coming together in partnerships", but businesses …nd it di¢ cult to cooperate and to enter into partnership with European research institutions.
11 According to the Commission, these di¢ culties may depend on businesses that invest in R&D look for adequate numbers of well-trained and mobile researchers and an excellent public research base. This elite can be found both in technologically advanced and in lagging regions.
At the same time, the technology spill over from the advanced regions to all other technology producers in the lagging regions is reduced. This paper also reports applications of the simulation model that examine how the cooperative behavior of businesses changes with regional system improvements produced by the regional authorities. We imagine the role of regional level policies as a task to a¤ect the context for decision making by technology producers. More speci…cally, this task is to regulate the exchange relations and to orchestrate the reasoning patterns and the dialogues. As Saxenian (1994) Interaction among producers of technology is discussed by Cantner and Graf (2004) , who …nd that regions that are technologically moderately specialised show the highest number of research cooperations. In addition, the more specialised a region is, the more cooperation takes place inside the region as compared with partners in other regions. Cantner and Graf's empirical research is not questioned here, but we try to improve their empirical predictions with the introduction of more factors explaining cooperative behavior. They consider cooperation in the context of positions technical workers have in a technology structure and …nd that the probability for cooperation depends on the degree to which exchange of knowledge is bene…cial to all sides involved. Bene…ts are associated with properties of the technology embedded in people (kind of knowledge and sophistication). We try to extend this view of cooperation to cover situations where the behavior of the technology producers also depends on their position as producers of intermediate goods. When advancing their commercial interests in the innovative process, technical workers probably feel a need to protect technological secrecies and there is reason to believe that this behavior in ‡uences research cooperation. A second type of feedback, working back from economic selection, on cooperative behavior is a …nancial constraint, which depends on the demand for innovative input by downstream producers. In the following, these two types of feedback will be examined through the lens of our simulation model.
Analysis using simulations 4.1 Cooperative behavior
The introduction to this paper mentions the goal of connecting Cantner and Graf's analysis of local innovation systems with Audretsch and Keilbach's approach to economic selection. Lechner and Dowling (1999) argue that the networks of innovators tend to be isolated when economic selection proceeds, which leads to decreased innovativeness. The inventors who survive believe that their success is not linked to the networks they have created. This tendency towards isolation is considered in our model, but our interpretation is that the inventors involved in industrial research are concerned about how to advance their technological designs in markets for technology. They believe there is a risk of imitation. Accordingly, inventors, who are alert to business opportunities, worry about how to protect the technology they develop. When they consider a business opportunity, and connections are established within the regional network, they try to keep technological knowledge secret. Social contacts with inventors, who are not involved in the advancement of the business opportunity, are broken with a certain probability and for a certain period of time (= 1 time step). After this period, new social contacts will be established according to the model presented in section 2. While the key entrepreneur is the only inventor who considers business opportunities all the time, he or she never breaks a social contact.
Lack of …nance is also a feedback working back from economic selection, which inhibits the development of a business opportunity within a regional innovation system. In recognising that the average holding-period for a venture capital investment is less than …ve years (Berglöf 1994) , we assume that a business opportunity, to survive, must be rewarded by an innovation within …ve years. Thus, the technology producers follow a simple rule that a regional network that turns out badly (i.e. is not rewarded with innovations), is termi-nated after …ve years. After a business opportunity has failed, the inventors lose prestige in the eyes of colleagues with whom they have no social contacts.
The probability for establishing contacts with the failing inventors is reduced to zero. Afterwards, the probability grows according to the model in section 2. On the other hand, social contacts between the inventors who shared the business opportunity will be unchanged, as well as all social contacts of the key entrepreneur.
The empirical predictions of our model cannot be directly measured against the results obtained by Cantner and Graf. We claim that the degree of specialisation (in terms of whether the knowledge of the technology producers complements or substitutes or di¤ers in sophistication) determines the probability that two inventors will exchange information at a meeting (p il ). In the spirit of Cantner and Graf, we associate a moderate specialisation with a high probability and a low or high level of specialisation is associated with low probability. That is, our inquiry into a decentralised approach to EU governance raises the question of whether the goals of the EU concerning e¢ cient production of advanced technology and economic growth can be achieved by regional-level policies, which try to increase p il by seeking to attain moderate specialisation.
Our answer to this question is based on properties of the model concerning the establishment of new contacts within the social network. It is claimed that the regional authorities can in ‡uence the number of meetings among technical workers -n il -through the launching of technology information centres, regional science and technology societies as well as through the provision of supplementary education. However, specialisation is a property of the purpose of the meetings, which concerns the type and speci…city of the knowledge created.
Thus, in this paper, infrastructural policies a¤ecting the number of meetings will be held constant (n il is …xed). Instead regional policies on the composition of expertise and counselling delivered by technology societies and information and education centres will be emphasised. Another result supports …ndings that networks depend on the presence of a key entrepreneur (Lechner & Dowling 1999; Gerybadze 1998; Sternberg 1996) .
One of the technology producers plays a missionary role in the model (the key entrepreneur, who considers business opportunities all the time) and thus has no interest in breaking contacts in the social network. Accordingly, he or she is more alert to establishing innovative relations than are the other inventors (…gure 2).
A comparison of …gures 1 and 2 suggests that the major part of the cooperative behavior develops after the key entrepreneur has established contacts with all inventors. Obviously, the key entrepreneur has a crucial intermediate position in the promotion of cooperative behavior.
Technical advance and regional growth
The "honeycombs" in …gures 1 and 2 are associated with …nancial constraints downstream …rms impose on the regional innovation system. Producers of new technology compete for selling designs to NEs and MNEs, which commercialise the designs. Di¢ culties with cooperative behavior occur when this chain is broken. Accordingly, e¢ cient markets for technology are crucial, where patents and licences are sold to …rms in one region, while investments in production facilities sometimes are made in another region. Since technology export from region i to region j contributes to the growth of region i, it should be discerned and analysed separately, which is a task for future research 13 .
One question arising is if there are policies to be adopted by the regional authorities, which remove the …nancial constraints on the innovation system. In answering this question we note that -according to our approach -the number of innovations depends on …rms'expectations about growth (cf. section 2). These expectations vary with changes in the growth of the total market for all product variants. That is, a zero-sum game between regions about …nance for innovative activities may be avoided by policies that stimulate macroeconomic growth. It is not clear whether this growth e¤ect can be achieved in a decentralised way through regional-level policies on the degree of specialisation of the regional innovation system.
Empirical evidence suggests a positive relation between entrepreneurial activity and growth at the regional level. Regions with high new-…rm startup rates gain from higher rates of growth (Audretsch & Keilbach 2004) . Our simulations provide some insight into the interrelationships between properties of the regional innovation system and entrepreneurial activities. To begin with, a policy that changes the degree of specialisation (p il ) seems to have no signi…cant e¤ect on the growth of the total market for all product variants. We return to this e¤ect below. This …nding suggests that the success a region may have in attracting …nance to innovations through improvements of the innovation system is achieved at the expense of other regions. Thus, the small increase in the number of entries (in particular by NEs) when p il changes, presented in …gures 3 and 4, is the outcome of competition between the regions.
Another result worth noting is a threshold of the innovation system. This threshold is interesting because passing it may not only a¤ect the number of entries by MNEs, but it also has an e¤ect on how MNEs assess their organisational The notion of organisational capital has been used before by Gort and Klepper (1982) . It is associated with information on new product technology that belongs to a …rm because it has a legal right to it or it depends upon the interdependent actions or information of more than one employee. Now, we hypothesize that policies that improve the innovation systems beyond the threshold portrayed in …gures 3 and 4 instead lead to a revaluation of the organisational capital, where it becomes more favorable for MNEs to invest in this type of capital.
One implication of assessing a higher value to the organisational capital is increased information "stickiness" (smaller values of 1 ):The share of the technology di¤usion between regions, which is external to the MNEs, will be reduced.
In our model, a small increase in information stickiness (-1 ) always reduces the spill over between technologically advanced and lagging regions (…gure 5).
The model takes into account that technology producers in lagging regions have di¢ culties in decoding technological information coming from the technologically advanced region. Accordingly, …gure 5 portrays di¤erences between large and small technology gaps. In the …rst case, the change in technology spill over, caused by a small change in the technology gap, is relatively small and independent of the size of the gap. For small gaps, however, the changes in the technology spill over become considerable when the gap changes. The changes in the technology spill over also depend on the amount of organisational capital held by the MNEs. The e¤ect of changes in the technology gap on the technology spill over becomes smaller for small ratios between transferable knowledge and organisational capital. Figure 5 shows that the reduction in spill over will decline with this ratio and this decline is more signi…cant for small technology gaps.
It is interesting to consider whether the regions can avoid zero-sum games between one another by coordinating their policies on the specialisation of the innovation systems with the strategies the MNEs choose for their organisational capital. As soon as the threshold of the regional innovation system is crossed, it becomes more attractive for MNEs to compete for advantageous positions within the system. The organisational capital becomes more valuable and the MNEs may respond and choose strategies to increase the organisational capital.
Overall, …gure 6 con…rms previously mentioned simulations suggesting that changes in the degree of specialisation within the innovation system seem to have a small e¤ect on the growth of the total market for all product variants.
The threshold e¤ect of the innovation system is apparent: changes in p il have no e¤ect on the macroeconomy as long as the conditions for cooperation are poor
(small values of p il ). If the threshold is crossed, however, policies on specialisation within the innovation system improving the conditions for cooperation among technology producers increase the growth of the total market, but this increase diminishes and seems to disappear for large p il . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that simulations based on evolutionary models including vertical disintegration (production of intermediate goods) and a geographic dimension (cooperation bene…ts from proximity, interregional technology di¤usion) generate a rich set of predictions suited for empirical research on regional-level technology policy and regional growth.
The topic we currently are exploring is how changes in regional innovation systems are connected with competitive (economic) selection. Our focus is on the technological specialisation of a region, the need of the technology producers to protect technological secrecies and the …nancial constraints on the innovation system, which depend on the demand for innovative input by downstream …rms.
For reasonable assumptions about the formation and downsizing of social and regional networks, the simulations suggest that both protection and …nance have signi…cant e¤ects on the cooperative behavior by the producers of technology.
They also provide a hint for policy-makers about the importance of the key entrepreneurial function: the major proportion of cooperative behavior develops after the key entrepreneur has established contacts with all inventors in the social network.
A pessimistic view of EU's Lisbon Strategy suggests that the promotion of advanced technology will lead to a spatial evolution of European economies, where the production of new technology with skilled and well-paid labour will be concentrated in a small number of fast-growing regions. At the same time, it is likely that advanced technology will di¤use across European regions with high standards of excellence, without any contribution to poor regions (Sharp & Pereira 2001) .
As a matter of fact, this is something the EU Commission suggests. It argues that retaining and attracting more R&D in Europe is tantamount to overcoming the fragmentation of public research. This is achieved by letting the European research area "structure itself along the lines of a powerful web of research and innovation clusters" with basis in "shared principles for knowledge transfer and cooperation between public research and industry". 14 The critical question about how the shaping of regional innovation systems can reduce regional imbalances and help the spatial equilibration seems to be of secondary interest. In order to overcome the fragmentation, the Commission also suggests the building of innovative capacity through integrated and networked pan-European infrastructures. 15 One result emerging from the simulations made for this paper is that the public knowledge base and the organisational capital of the businesses should be seen as complementary implying that improvements in the infrastructures and their connectivity can increase the value of the organisational capital.
Contrary to the purpose of the Commission to encourage the businesses to cooperate with European research institutions, higher value of the information about technology that belongs to the businesses can make them reluctant to share technological knowledge.
Inspired by simulations, we call attention to the "regional conscious" development model, discussed in the paper. It turns out that regional politicians, who master regional innovation systems of medium conditions for cooperation, are in a position to foster macroeconomic growth and regional balance by improvements of the system. A critical task of the politicians, however, is to ensure an e¢ cient coordination of public investments in knowledge structures and strategies for knowledge management by MNEs. 
